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A partner who wants out of a private company sometimes finds there is nowhere to go

A partner who wants out of a private company sometimes finds there is nowhere to go.

This week Calcalist reported on a dispute among the partners in the La Shuk restaurant group in Tel Aviv. One of the shareholders, who wants to leave, filed an NIS 8 million claim against the two controlling shareholders. He asks the court to appoint a valuation expert and order them to buy his shares. He claims he was pushed out, and in 2025 he received almost no dividends. The other side has not yet filed its position, and I take no view on the dispute itself.

What is interesting here is the structure, not the parties.

A share in a public company can simply be sold on the stock exchange. Minority shares in a private company have no buyer. The other partners are usually the only buyers, and they have no duty to buy.

When the founders' agreement has no exit mechanism, such as BMBY or a put option, the minority shareholder is left with mainly one path: to claim oppression. Section 191 of the Companies Law allows the court, among other things, to order a share purchase. But to get there you must show that the majority's conduct oppressed him, and that is a long, expensive and uncertain process.

And another point many people miss: a shareholder has no right to receive a dividend. The decision to distribute is the board's, and in a small private company the board is usually the controlling shareholders. So in disputes like these the argument quickly moves to where the money goes instead of dividends: salaries, management fees, rent paid for assets owned by the controlling shareholders.

The bottom line: a partners' agreement is written when everyone is friends, but it is meant for the day when they no longer are. A clear exit clause signed on day one is far cheaper than an oppression claim on the last day.

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